



Land-use conflicts highlight several myths about property rights. The central myth is that property
rights are linked to natural rights, that property rights are durable and unchanging, and that any
interference with these property rights requires public compensation. However, particular settings and
circumstances lead to conflicting rights claims which the courts must sort through to determine where
the more compelling rights claim resides. Situations are not protected because they have property
rights. Rather, those situations found worthy of protection by the courts acquire the status of a
property right. Property rights are not discovered, but are created by the courts. Applied economists
must build models of property rights conflicts predicated upon an epistemology of volitional
pragmatism.
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Applied economists interested in land-use matters
come to this policy issue with two distinct concep-
tual frameworks (models) in mind. The first model
concerns the idea and practice of property rights
in America. The second model concerns how
decisions ought to be made in a democratic market
economy.
Notice that the first model is simply acquired—
picked up, learned, memorized—by the economist
who decides to undertake work on land-use matters.
This may be thought of as the necessary institutional
detail if an economist is to do something pertinent
about an important public policy issue.
In contrast, the second model is at the core of
what it means to be an applied economist. If one is
an applied economist, one is expected to subscribe
to—indeed to become an advocate for—a particular
approach to public policy. This approach is conse-
quentialist welfarism (Sen, 1993). We see this belief
in the admonishments of a wide variety of econo-
mists, though only a few recent examples are
mentioned here (Arrow et al., 1996; Palmer, Oates
and Portney, 1995).
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In practical terms, some economists imagine it is
their professional obligation to be “advocates for
efficiency.”
1 After all, if economists do not prosely-
tize for efficiency, it is unlikely anyone else will
take up that cause. And of course the world is quite
full of individuals seeking to make it less efficient.
We call them politicians, bureaucrats, and rent-
seekers. We may even have heard that environ-
mental groups are part of some conspiracy seeking
the preservation of green space and that by these
actions they will destroy an otherwise efficient econ-
omy, and they will most certainly stifle American
agriculture as we have come to know it.
The advocates of this second model usually hold
firmly to the belief that economics is an objective
and value-free science. Their convictions along this
line seem not to deter them from telling us how pub-
lic policy ought to be carried out in the interest of
efficiency—as if by this act they were not violating
their belief system about the scientific purity of eco-
nomics. Apparently these economists continue to hold
that efficiency is a value-free truth rule and they
therefore see nothing wrong with being its advocate.
1 This is, I suppose, like geographers being advocates for the study of
geography, nuclear engineers being advocates for nuclear power, and
social workers being advocates for social work. There are important differ-
ences, of course, but notice each discipline imagines the world would be
a better place if we would but pay greater attention to what it is the practi-
tioners of each craft can do to help in that quest.
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 32/1 (April 2003): 9S17
Copyright 2003 Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association10   April 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
This supposition is jeopardized by the indirect
theorem of welfare economics arguing that compet-
itive markets will sustain a Pareto optimal state for
any one of infinitely many starting points of
institutions and endowments. Since public policy is
precisely devoted to the task of altering institutions
and endowments (the capitalized value of future
income streams defined and parameterized, by the
way, by existing institutions), it defies logic to
suppose that advocacy for efficiency can be thought
at all useful to this exercise, let alone be considered
neutral and value-free. But this message, understood
for at least two decades by welfare theorists, and
certainly not held a state secret by them, seems to
be of little interest to many applied economists.
My task here is to explore the logical under-
pinnings of the first of these conceptual models.
Specifically, I will discuss the dominant presump-
tions in the idea and practice of property rights.
These common presumptions are: (a) property rights
are clear, stable, and unchanging; (b) the owner of
a piece of American real estate is the final authority
about what activities may or may not occur on that
land; and (c) if currently permissible activities are
attenuated by government regulations, then compen-
sation must be forthcoming.
As for the second model, I will not again try to
explain why consequentialist welfarism is flawed
and incoherent for guiding public policy. This has
been done (Bromley, 1989, 1990). I shall let the
existing literature speak for itself on this matter, and
will instead offer the broad outlines of an alternative
approach to public policy which I think might be
helpful to our work on land-use issues. I will not, to
be sure, offer tendentious prescriptions about how
public policy ought to be structured and evaluated.
Rather, I will present a theory—an explanation—of
the policy process as I believe it exists. I hope this
theory will give you a new perspective on public
policy in a democratic market economy.
Property Rights in America
John Locke plays an important role in the American
idea of property rights. Locke’s theory starts from
a mythical state of nature in which God directs man
to take dominion over land by mixing his labor with
it (Kreuckeberg, 1999). Having done so, it is then
necessary to bestow permanence of control (owner-
ship) over the thing labored on. From this starting
point, Locke and his adherents insist the essential
purpose of the state is to protect those who have
labored as God commanded, and thereby to bestow
on others the beneficial effects arising from this
class of hard-working citizens. The state is thereby
obligated to protect those who now hold “property.”
If one acquires land in the Lockean way, then it has
been justly acquired, and its continued holding is
justified on moral grounds. Equally important, this
holding is justified on prudential grounds since the
effect of individuals holding land is the production
of benefits to the community at large.
But history reveals there must always be a bal-
ance between the interests of the individual owner
and what serves the community at large:
Property was to be an aid to creative work, not an alter-
native to it.... The law of the village bound the peasant to
use his land, not as he himself might find most profit-
able, but to grow the corn the village needed.... Property
reposed in short, not merely upon convenience, or the
appetite for gain, but on a moral principle. It was pro-
tected not only for the sake of those who owned, but for
the sake of those who worked and of those for whom
their work provided. It was protected, because, without
security for property, wealth could not be produced or the
business of society carried on (Tawney, 1978, p. 139).
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Locke recognized that as the earth filled up, and
as less and less of God’s Commons was available
for free expropriation, a certain inconvenience might
arise. As Locke put the matter, his theory of justi-
fied acquisition and subsequent justified holding
worked only so long as there was “enough and as
good” for others.
This Lockean proviso brings us to Immanuel Kant.
Kant noted that rights are not tangible empirical real-
ities (possessio phenomenon), but rather noumena
(possessio noumenon). Those things which cannot
be apprehended by the senses but are knowable only
by reason are known as noumena (Williams, 1977).
Kant asked what conditions were necessary in
order that an individual might be able to make
internal something that is, by its very nature,
external. The key idea here is one of belonging—of
belonging to. Something external to an individual is
made internal by understanding the idea of belong-
ing to. And how is it decided that something external
belongs to an individual?
The individual may well declare that some partic-
ular object or situation belongs to her. Notice this is
a claim against all others to whom the object or situ-
ation might otherwise belong. Something external
has now, by dint of unilateral proclamation, become
internal to the speaker. Kant recognized that such
2  For a more extensive treatment of property as a “social institution,” see
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claims represent negations of the interests of others
within the same community. And he suggested that
while one individual may indeed announce and dis-
play physical possession of something external, this
was not the same as having a socially sanctioned
authority to make that declaration binding on others
who might wish to make internal the very same
thing. That is, unless others to whom the possessor
directs his assertion are predisposed to respect those
claims, the situation is unstable and therefore cannot
be expected to settle the matter once and for all.
Kant observed it is only from the consent of
others that one can make internal that which is
clearly external. For if that external thing can
belong to anyone within the community, what
mental process will allow it to become internal (to
belong) to any particular member of the commun-
ity? Why should others willingly accept binding
duties on nothing more compelling than the self-
serving assertions of those already in possession of
something of potential value to others?
Kant argued that such assertions are nothing but
the affirmation of empirical possession. And by
being based on mere possession (possessio phenom-
enon), they confuse physical control with something
much more profound. This more profound circum-
stance is one that Kant called “intelligible posses-
sion” (possessio noumenon). We see intelligible
possession at work when a community of sentient
beings reaches agreement that indeed it is both right
(moral) and good (prudential) that someone among
them should be able to make internal something
which has hitherto been external.
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On this account, what is mine depends not on
what I say about it being mine. Rather, what is mine
becomes mine by virtue of the assertions of all others
who, by their declaration, acquiesce in their own
disenfranchisement from the benefits associated
with that object or circumstance (Samuels, 1989).
Others grant me possessio noumenon—I cannot
take it for myself.
Locke gave us a basis for justified acquisition
and holding of land (“property”) as long as there is
“enough and as good” for others (Becker, 1977;
Christman, 1994). But Locke stopped short of a
complete theory of what is to be done when there is
not enough and as good for others. That is, Locke
developed a theory of acquisition and holding
which works best when it is needed least. It is here
that Kant insisted the continued holding of land
(“property”) in the face of scarcity requires some-
thing very special. For scarcity raises the specter of
deprivation and exclusion if Lockean acquisition
and holding works against the interests of others in
the community who—by virtue of coming late—
find that all of God’s Commons has already been
justly acquired. How are we to explain (justify) hold-
ing of land (“property”) once there is no more of it
to be justly acquired?
Contemporary Lockeans have a ready answer to
this question: let the latecomers buy it from those
who have justly acquired it (or who have previously
purchased it). We see that once the initial acquisi-
tion has been transferred to another for a price, the
logic seems compelling and without end—all future
acquisitions must be mediated by due consideration
to the extant holder of land (“property”). And what
is transferred in this way is—and must be—precisely
what earlier acquirers obtained. Just acquisition and
holding continues into perpetuity.
This seeming escape from the grips of scarcity
leaves one fundamental issue still to be addressed.
What if the current holding results in land-use prac-
tices that, in the fullness of time, are found to be
neither moral nor prudential? Given this possibility,
on what grounds can payment then be justified in
order to induce the current holder to stop using her
land (“property”) in an antisocial manner? In other
words, what is to preclude one or more holders of
land from engaging in social extortion? We see that
land justly acquired may evolve into land unjustly
held—its current use is no longer moral or pru-
dential.
Here, Locke joins Kant in admitting that under
certain circumstances the presumed beneficial link
between acquisition and holding might be severed.
Recall that Locke presumed land justly acquired
would be used in a manner that redounded to the
benefit of the entire community, and that fact was
part of the justification for its acquisition and
continued holding. But what if this is not the case?
Kant answered with the proposition that the com-
munity itself must determine whether land justly
acquired remains justly held.
How is this to be done? It is accomplished through
reason emerging from a burgerliche gesellschaft—a
civil society. In other words, it is the community
itself that sets the standards by which continued
holding of justly acquired land (“property”) remains
3  We see immediately that the essence of empirical possession is a dog
with a bone. There is not, nor can there be, recognition among the
community of dogs—all of whom covet the bone—that it “belongs to” the
one in whose mouth it now resides. The most one can say is that they
acknowledge possession. It takes Kantian reason to transcend empirical
possession. Dogs are as incapable of possessio noumenon as they are of the
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justified. If this is the case, then the security and
timeless stability of the idea of property rights is
suddenly undermined. How is it possible that some-
thing as foundational as property rights can rest on
nothing more solid than the whims of an entire
community? Surely, down this road lies chaos.
Or, perhaps, down this road lies what we might
call constructive malleability. We are, it would
seem, in need of a new theory of holding. Such a
theory must offer an explanation (justification) for
difficult decisions about just and prudential holdings
into the future. In more practical terms, this alter-
native theory must address the issue of what to do
when extant holdings are found to warrant just
attenuation—and then under what circumstances, if
any, compensation for that attenuation must be forth-
coming from the state. Must payment using public
funds always be forthcoming for this attenuation?
This is the essential “takings” question. Can the
government—acting as an agent for those whose
interests are contravened by the actions of a land-
owner—prevent those actions? And if so, must the
owner be compensated from the public treasury for
this new inability?
It is here that we will encounter a few economists
intent on discerning whether or not regulations
are “efficient.” Or they will seek to discover the
“optimal” regulation of land-use practices. Or they
will write about the efficiency properties of various
approaches to the “takings” question.
Welfarism at Work in the Arena 
of Property Rights
Economists are by now apparently comfortable dis-
cussing the relative efficiency of alternative property
rights regimes (Alston, Eggertsson, and North,
1996; Knight, 1992; Knight and North, 1997; North,
1990). This work seems to overlook the fact that
efficiency judgments of alternative institutional
arrangements are inherently circular. For a quick
primer on this matter, recall institutions determine
what is a cost and what is a benefit. From this it fol-
lows that any judgment of efficiency is necessarily
based upon the institutional structure indicating
what costs must be accounted for—and by whom
(Bromley, 1989, 1991).
Moreover, any explanation of institutions and effi-
ciency must be grounded upon the two fundamental
theorems of welfare economics. The first theorem
tells us that in the absence of external effects, every
competitive market equilibrium is Pareto optimal.
The second theorem (called the “indirect theorem”
above) tells us that starting from any particular insti-
tutional setup (the working rules plus income and
wealth endowments), every Pareto optimal state is
a competitive equilibrium.
The first theorem is a ratification of the idea of
competitive markets which economists find par-
ticularly endearing. The second theorem is more
encompassing—it tells us that any initial endow-
ment and rule structure can result in a Pareto optimal
state as long as competitive markets are the means
whereby trades are negotiated. Indeed, as Sen (1993)
has remarked, the second welfare theorem might
well comprise the essence of the “Revolutionary’s
Handbook.” That is, for any particular structure of
institutions and property rights, competitive markets
will yield a Pareto optimal outcome. And since each
of the infinitely many institutional arrangements can
produce optimal outcomes, the decision on which
particular structure to adopt cannot be decided on
economic grounds. It is here that we encounter
confusion in the literature between “efficiency” and
“productivity” (Saraydar, 1989).
Some of the literature seems to suggest new insti-
tutions are (or ought to be) the outcome of bargaining
among political and economic agents. According to
this line of argument, those institutions emerge
which will bestow future benefit streams on the
most successful (powerful) bargaining entities
(Knight, 1992). One may wish to take notice of the
abiding circularity here. Since “power” is often
defined as the ability of an agent (or an entity) to
exert self-serving influence over economic and
political outcomes, it cannot possibly surprise us
that those outcomes which emerge are the inevitable
result of actions on the part of those with the most
“power.”
I suggest a more credible definition of “power,”
for the purposes of building a theory of institutional
change, is that power is the ability of an individual
or a group to force another individual or group into
a new legal situation not of their choosing.
Notice the important distinction here. The com-
petition model of the new institutionalists regards
institutional change as the inevitable outcome of a
bargaining process among the potential gainers
and losers of some particular institutional change.
Those who gained had more “power” while those
who lost had less “power.” In addition to the
circularity here, notice that the collective power of
the state is absent in this model—appearing only at
the end to ratify the outcome resulting from the
interaction of differentially “powerful” bargaining
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Of course this is not a theory, but an ex post
“explanation” having all the properties of justifica-
tionism. We would not expect, I imagine, to learn
that the party with the least power turned out to be
the gainer, while the party with the most power
ended up as a loser. Theories seeking to explain
everything explain nothing.
In fact, on my definition of power, we see that
the collective authority is at the center of new
institutional arrangements. Power is the capacity of
one party to put another party in an unfavorable and
unwanted legal situation. There is only one way to
do that—one party is able to enlist the collective
authority of the state to force an unwanted insti-
tutional arrangement upon an unwilling party. Just
as changes in ownership of future benefits streams
in a market require the presence of the state to ratify
those new ownership arrangements, changes in legal
standing among members of a polity require the
presence of the state to ratify and agree to enforce
those new legal relations. The state is a necessary
party to every transaction. I shall have more to say
on this below.
The central problem here is reliance on a theory
of institutional change that employs the market as
the guiding metaphor, and that uses market outcomes
as the truth rule by which outcomes of institutional
change ought to be judged. Unfortunately these are
mere stories wishing to become theories. These
stories cannot become theories because they share
one central flaw. This flaw is that they seek to
explain institutions (the rules of the game) by appeal
to rational choice models whose raison d’etre is to
understand and explain individual behavior under-
taken within specific rule structures (institutions)
(Field, 1979, 1981). If one seeks to explain collec-
tive action from the perspective of methodological
individualism, then failure is the only possible out-
come.
4
Let me be very clear about this. Institutions,
because they are the product of collective action in
the legislature and the courts to liberate and
restrain individual action, cannot possibly emerge
from market-like competition or bargaining. If we
wish to have a fully identified theory of institutional
change, we must embed institutions elsewhere in
economic relations.
It is to this point I now turn.
Volitional Pragmatism: Avoiding Welfarism
Outcomes of available actions are not ascertained but
created. We are not speaking ... of the objective recorded
outcomes of actions which have been performed. Those
actions are not “available.” An action which can still be
chosen or rejected has no objective outcome. The only
kind of outcome which it can have exists in the imagin-
ation of the decision-maker (Shackle, 1961, p. 143).
If we are to develop an improved theory of land-
use conflicts in America, it will first require that we
abandon deduction in favor of abduction. Abduc-
tion is a class of inference that yields explanatory
hypotheses for—or explanations of—observed phe-
nomena. In contrast to deduction, abduction is not
the result of the application of axioms, assumptions,
and applicability postulates to produce a theory.
Instead, abductive knowledge starts with particular
known empirical circumstances and then invokes
specific axioms, assumptions, and applicability pos-
tulates to produce explanatory propositions (testable
hypotheses) about the observed phenomena. These
propositions might then come to constitute a theory
of the nature and content of the thing under
scrutiny. On the current case, this thing is the idea
and practice of property rights and land-use issues
in America.
Aristotle referred to this way of knowing as
“diagnosis” (Ducasse, 1925). And so it is—this is
the epistemology of those whose task it is to diag-
nose empirical phenomena—physicians, automobile
mechanics contemplating an engine that will not
start, and pathologists who perform autopsies. I
follow Charles Sanders Peirce in referring to this as
abduction (Peirce, 1934). We use abduction when
we observe certain empirical regularities (or irregu-
larities) in the world around us and seek to construct
plausible explanations.
The contrasts between deduction and abduction
can be illustrated as follows. If we are interested in
land-use conflicts, the deductivist will be inclined to
ask the following question: “Does this particular
Supreme Court protect—or fail to protect—property
rights?” The deductivist will then invoke hypoth-
eses (assumptions) which will render a tentative
answer to that question. Or, the deductivist will ask
a somewhat more subtle question: “What is the
position of this particular Supreme Court with
respect to property rights?” Notice that both of
these questions start with a prior idea of the nature
of property rights, and the investigator then seeks to
answer his/her own question by reading carefully,
and by parsing, particular legal decisions.
4  Methodological individualism holds that the individual is the sufficient
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The abductivist would find these questions
seriously flawed. The questions are flawed because
they presume (axiomatically) the prior nature and
scope of something (property rights) that is the very
idea (concept) requiring explanation. It is akin to
asking a three-year old if she is “telling the truth.”
The abductivist has a more promising epistemology.
The abductivist would observe a series of Supreme
Court decisions which, on their face, appear to hold
quite different implications for the concept (the a
priori idea) of property rights.
Candidate land-use cases—the empirical phenom-
ena requiring explanation—might easily include a
few of the classic cases of recent memory: Euclid
v. Ambler Realty, Teleprompter Co. v. Loretto,
Hadachek v. Sebastian, Mugler v. Kansas, Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, Agins
v. City of Tiburon, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
deBenedictis, Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Palazzolo v.
State of Rhode Island, and most recently Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency.
To the deductivist, the findings in these cases
appear idiosyncratic, and without logical coherence.
These cases are the stuff of long and tortured
exegetical law review articles in search of some
unifying explanatory thread. After all, the Supreme
Court must have some guiding principles by which
it resolves property rights disputes (Sax, 1983).
Aren’t there durable legal doctrines that inform
decisions in such important cases? The deductivist
would be quite unable to advance a plausible theory
of property rights in America.
The abductivist, rather than finding these cases
perplexing, would use their very “confounding”
reality as the starting point for working out a theory
of property rights. That is, these cases and their
findings are the very reality that cries out for a
theory—an explanation. And there is a plausible
explanation for these seeming disparate decisions
by the Supreme Court, but it will require the joining
of abduction with the idea of volitional pragmatism.
To the economist interested in land-use matters,
I submit that the only way to understand the idea of
property rights in the American experience is to
understand this term is the benediction applied to
those settings and circumstances which, when the
dust of consideration by various levels of juris-
prudence has finally settled, are found worthy of
indemnification by the state. This proposition springs
from the logic of volitional pragmatism.
Notice the term property right is not something
known axiomatically—something whose essence is
clear to us by intuition or introspection before the
specifics of a particular legal struggle are joined.
Rather, the idea of property rights is arrived at—
created—in the process of resolving mutually
exclusive “rights claims” before the court. That is,
property rights are not a priori “essences” that exist
and await mere discovery in a particular legal
scuffle. Property rights are created in the process of
resolving disputes originating in conflicting rights
claims brought before the courts. This means the
American judicial system does not seek to discover
where the a priori property right lies. Rather, courts
offer a necessary forum before which, from time to
time, conflicting and mutually exclusive rights
claims will be brought. When the more compelling
rights claim has been determined, the courts will
issue a decree to that effect. Thus, property rights
are made, not found.
This recognition follows necessarily from the
meaning of “right.” To have a right means you have
been granted the ability to compel the coercive
power of the state to come to your assistance against
the contrary claims of others. Rights allow an
individual to enlist the wondrous powers of the state
as your very special ally. The granting of a right by
the state (and the courts are but the final arbiters of
state action) does not imply passive support by the
state. Rather, that grant bestows active assistance
for those to whom the state has granted the status of
a “right.” That is, the state stands ready to be
enlisted in the cause of those to whom it has granted
rights. We say that rights expand the capacities of
the individual by indicating what one can do with
the aid of the collective power (Bromley, 1989;
Macpherson, 1973; Commons, 1968).
We must also understand that property is not an
object, but is instead a value. When one buys a piece
of land (in the vernacular, a “piece of property”),
one acquires not some physical object, but rather
control over a benefit stream arising from that
setting and circumstance which runs into the future.
That is why one spends money (one benefit stream)
in order to acquire a different benefit stream (a new
benefit stream arising from the fact of “ownership”).
Notice the magnitude of this new benefit stream is
a function of the legal parameters associated with it.
Can one build a tall office tower on it, or a mere
bungalow? Is it now covered by water six months
out of the year? And if so, will local ordinances
allow it to be drained for some “higher” (i.e., a
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The price paid to acquire the new benefit stream
is none other than the expected discounted present
value of all future net income appropriable from
“owning” the thing. This is why property is the
value, not the object (Bromley, 1991; Macpherson
1973, 1978). And of course, we put together two
concepts—property and right—to arrive at the
understanding that this pertains to the grant of
authority by the state to a person now called an
“owner.” Such authority promises that the state is a
willing participant in the imposition of binding
duties on all those in the class of individuals called
“non-owner.”
I insisted above that the courts create property
rights out of the disputes coming before them
(Bromley, 1993, 1997). This act of creation stands
in contrast to the idea that the courts discover prop-
erty rights as they dig into conflicting rights claims.
What might this idea of “creation” entail? Here I
draw on Louis Menand’s recent book, The Meta-
physical Club (Menand, 2001). Menand’s subject
concerns the origins of pragmatic philosophy in
America. Central players in this story include
William James, John Dewey, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, and Charles Sanders Peirce. And of course
Holmes turned out to be one of the most celebrated
of American legal theorists. Menand writes, “It was
Holmes’s genius as a philosopher to see that the law
has no essential aspect” (Menand, 2001, p. 339).
Menand, in writing about Holmes and his
seminal work, The Common Law, notes this book
(compiled from 12 Lowell Lectures presented at the
Harvard Law School in 1880) was intended to trace
and explain the evolution of legal doctrine. More
importantly, the lectures were an attempt to explain
the remark made by Holmes in his very first law
review article in 1870: “It is the merit of the common
law that it decides the case first, and determines the
principle afterwards” (Menand, 2001, p. 339). This
of course is a paradox. If legal principles don’t
decide cases, what does? Holmes’ answer to this
paradox provides the basis of all of his later
jurisprudence. Menand conveys Holmes’ views as
follows:
A case comes to court as a unique fact situation. It
immediately enters a kind of vortex of discursive imper-
atives. There is the imperative to find the just result in
this particular case. There is the imperative to find the
result that will be consistent with the results reached in
analogous cases in the past. There is the imperative to
find the result that, generalized across many similar
cases, will be most beneficial to society as a whole—the
result that will send the most useful behavioral message.
There are also, though less explicitly acknowledged, the
desire to secure the outcome most congenial to the
judge’s own politics; the desire to use the case to bend
legal doctrine so that it will conform better with changes
in social standards and conditions; and the desire to pun-
ish the wicked and excuse the good, and to redistribute
costs from parties who can’t afford them (like accident
victims) to parties who can (like manufacturers and insur-
ance companies).
Hovering over this whole unpredictable weather pat-
tern—all of which is already in motion, as it were, before
the particular case at hand ever arises—is a single meta-
imperative. This is the imperative not to let it appear as
though any one of these lesser imperatives has decided
the case at the blatant expense of the others. A result that
seems just intuitively but is admittedly incompatible with
legal precedent is taboo; so is a result that is formally
consistent with precedent but appears unjust on its face
(Menand, 2001, p. 339).
And Menand continues:
Many years later, when Holmes was on the Supreme
Court, Holmes used to invite his fellow justices, in con-
ference, to name any legal principle they liked, and he
would use it to decide the case under consideration either
way.... When there are no bones, anybody can carve a
goose (Menand, 2001, p. 340).
Volitional pragmatism is the core idea of
American jurisprudence, and it offers a theory not
only of general jurisprudence, but it is particularly
apt to land-use conflicts that are charged with
figuring out where the most compelling—notice I
did not say “correct” or “efficient”—property inter-
ests lie. The problem here is to blend moral and
prudential arguments in search for the best thing to
do. This best thing will comprise the “truth” in that
particular setting. In fact, we may say truth is
merely that which it is better, at the moment, to
believe (Rorty, 1979, 1982, 1999). Or, as William
James (1907) would put the matter, “truth happens
to an idea.” Specifically, “truth” is the compliment
we pay to our settled deliberations of a specific
matter.
What Is the Economist to Do?
The land-use conflicts of interest to applied econo-
mists can be several. Perhaps a community wishes
to establish a policy on tear-downs and the spread
of McMansions. Perhaps a community wishes to stop
the spread of suburbs into green space now occupied
by agriculture and/or open space. Perhaps a com-
munity wishes to stop the destruction of trees on pri-
vate property. Perhaps a community wishes to control
the kinds of landscaping acceptable for houses and16   April 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
commercial buildings. Perhaps a jurisdiction (say a
state) wishes to regulate the draining of wetlands no
longer protected under federal law by the Clean
Water Act.
The answer here is clear. The courts will sanction
each of these actions if there is a clear connection
between the actions and the general well-being
of the community as articulated in some legitimate
process by that community. Notice here the
connection between democratic processes and com-
munity articulation of a particular vision for the
future. This is not, to be sure, an exercise in benefit-
cost analysis as economists carry out that exercise.
It is, instead, recognition of the need and the desire
for the nation state to adjust to new priorities, new
tastes and preferences, and new threats to desired
futures.
These desired futures are created out of a process
of the human will in action, looking to the future,
and deciding how we wish that future to unfold for
us. Landowners sitting among this process may well
see themselves as being victimized by the shifting
whims of public sentiment about the purposes of
nature. Aren’t wetlands for draining? Aren’t forests
for cutting down? Aren’t rivers for damming? Not
any more, they are not, and it is increasingly unlikely
that landowners will be able to manufacture plaus-
ible claims for compensation (“takings”) as this
process continues.
Many people imagine that property rights are
secure, do not change, and are timeless protections
against the state. If these same people are capital-
izing their future well-being on this presumption,
then they would be well advised to diversify their
portfolio. Public policy is collective action in
liberation, restraint, and expansion of individual
action. That collective action in America occurs in
the legislature and the courts. And as collective
ideas about what seems better to do with land and
related assets continue to evolve, the courts will
be less and less likely to order the expenditure of
tax receipts sitting in the public purse to compen-
sate private landowners who appear to be slow
learners.
John R. Commons would call this reasonable
valuing (Hiedanpää and Bromley, 2002). Prag-
matists would call it what seems better to believe.
The general public, whose taxes stand exposed to
the predations of those who still wish to defy
evolving social norms about land-use practices, call
it good-old common sense. And, as we know, truth
is just common sense clarified.
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